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COMMENT
TITLE IX'S PROMISE OF EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS: DOES IT COVER
THE BASES?
Equal education opportunity for women is the law of the
land-and it will be enforced.'
Equal Funding Said Not Necessary2
INTRODUCTION
Widespread discrimination has been practiced against
females in the United States since the founding of the nation.3
Societal stereotypes and the common law have combined to
confine women to a different and generally inferior status.4 In
I Statement by Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, in Washington, D. C., June 3, 1975.
2 Lexington Herald, June 6, 1975, at 16, col. 1.
I See generally Bayh, The Equal Rights Amendment, 6 IND. L. REv. 1 (1972);
Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law, 48
NEB. L. REV. 131 (1968). For accounts of the legal status of women in English and
American history, see E. FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE (1959); L. KANowlTz, WOMEN
AND THE LAW (1969); Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15
BOSTON U. L. REV. 723 (1935); Note, Sex Discrimination and the Constitution, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 691 (1950). On the prevalence of discrimination in the American legal system
today see in addition to the above materials, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS
OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOMEN (1963); THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES, REPORT: A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE (1970) [hereinafter cited
as SIMPLE JUSTICE]; Cavanagh, "A Little Dearer Than His Horse": Legal Stereotypes
and the Feminine Personality, 6 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 260 (1971); Sei-
denberg, The Submissive Majority: Modern Trends in the Law Concerning Women's
Rights, 55 CoRN. L. REV. 262 (1970); Hearings, The Equal Rights Amendment, S.J.
Res. 61, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
(May 1970); Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16,098 Before the Special Subcomm. on
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Discrimination Against Women]; Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 & S.J.
Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Hearings on H.R. 208 Before the Subcomm. on Equal
Opportunities of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Women's Educational Equity].
Brief for National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc.
as Amicus Curiae at 8, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);
The evidence is overwhelming that persistent patterns of sex discrimination
permeate our social, cultural and economic life. Much of this discrimination
is directly attributable to state action, both in maintaining archaic discrimi-
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the past, the subordination of more than half the population
has been widely accepted as natural or necessary or divinely
ordained.5 Women crusaded in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries to obtain the vote, but only recently has the women's
liberation movement challenged the denial of other legal rights
and opportunities as well as the retention of stereotyped roles
for women and men.' Despite the recent impetus for change,
or perhaps because of it, "major remnants of the common law's
discriminatory treatment of women persist in the laws and
institutions of all states."7 Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 19728 (Title IX) and its implementing regulations
purport to correct this imbalance in education.
Although equality of opportunity has been called the
"most basic doctrine in our country's social policy,"'" there is
no doubt that "present educational programs in the United
States are inequitable as they relate to women and limit their
full participation in American society."" "The early education
and socialization of children play a large part in the develop-
natory laws and in tolerating and perpetrating discriminatory practices in
employment, education and other areas . . . . That the majority of our
population should be subjected to the indignities and limitations of second-
class citizenship is a fundamental affront to personal human liberty.
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring):
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits
it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly be-
longs to the domain and functions of womanhood . . . . The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
The genesis of such thought is cited to such Biblical passages as:
And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept: and
he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof; And the rib,
which the Lord God has taken from a man, made he a woman.
Genesis 2:21.
' PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1963) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
' Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitu-
tional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 872-73 (1971).
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1973).
HEW Regs., 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1975).
,0 GILES, THE INTEGRATED CLASSROOM 105 (1959).
1Women's Educational Equity, supra note 3, at 1. These hearings occurred after
passage of Title IX but before regulations were created to enforce the legislation.
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ment of attitudes and career motivation." 2 If schools are to
provide for the needs of females in light of the realities of large
numbers of working women, nondiscriminatory laws and the
new recognition of women's rights, those schools must move
beyond the educational opportunities that have traditionally
existed. Title IX is a legislative attempt to provide educational
opportunities for women by making all aspects of the educa-
tional process nondiscriminatory,'" a necessary commitment
following earlier national policy entitling women to total equal-
ity in employment." Title IX was enacted by Congress on June
23, 1972.15 On June 20, 1974, the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare (HEW) published its proposed implementing
regulations.'6 On July 21, 1975, more than three years after
enactment of the bill,'7 the final HEW regulations'" went into
effect to insure that:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
22 121 CONG. REC. S 13,528 (daily ed. July 24, 1975) (remarks of Senator Clark).
'3 Women's Educational Equity, supra note 3, at 230: "Growing up equal is not
growing up in the same ways but rather growing up with opportunities that permit each
person to develop and grow in ways that are consistent with their values, culture and
potential."
" SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 3, excerpted in 117 CONG. REC. 30, 405-06 (1970):
What this Task Force recommends is a national commitment to basic
changes that will bring women into the mainstream of American life. Such
a commitment, we believe is necessary to healthy psychological, social and
economic growth of our society . . . . Discrimination in education is one of
the most damaging injustices women suffer. It denies them equal educa-
tional and equal employment opportunity, contributing to a second class self
image.
See also Women's Educational Equity, supra note 3, at 165.
Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title IX, § 901, 86 Stat. 373 (June 23, 1972).
28 HEW Regs., 39 Fed. Reg. 22, 232 (1974).
27 The long delay between enactment of Title IX and publication of the final
implementing regulations is evidence of the care with which HEW proceeded in at-
tempting to formulate workable, reasonable standards. Telephone inquiry to Frank
Kreuger, General Counsel, Office of Civil Rights, Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, Washington, D.C., July 25, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Telephone
inquiry]; H.E.W., Office of Civil Rights, Memorandum to Chief State School Officers,
Superintendents of Local Educational Agencies and College and University presi-
dents-Subject: Elimination of Sex Discrimination in Athletic Programs 3 (Sept. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as HEW Memorandum].
1 HEW Regs., 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1975).
[Vol. 64
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be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 11
HEW takes the position that physical education and ath-
letics constitute an integral part of the educational processes
of schools and colleges, 20 and that, as such, they are fully sub-
ject to the requirements of Title IX, even if federal funds are
not directly allocated to the schools' athletic programs." How-
ever, the regulations attempt to balance the vested interests of
educational institutions with the goal of equality of opportun-
ity for women in this particular area. As Secretary Weinberger
indicated when HEW's final regulations were presented:
We wanted to eliminate the very evident and obvious dis-
crimination that has taken place against women in athletics
and sports over the years, mostly unconsciously, I think, by
the schools. At the same time, we did not want to disrupt the
entire pattern of American college life, or indeed a large part
of American life itself. . . .I think this regulation will...
enhance markedly the opportunities for women in athletics.
But, it will also allow schools certain flexibility.2
The HEW regulations regarding physical education and
athletics rely upon the reasoning and distinctions developed in
the court cases which were decided in the interim between the
enactment of Title IX and the promulgation of the regulations
and which addressed the fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion argument." Reliance upon such cases is questionable,
however, because the small number of fourteenth amendment
cases deal chiefly with high school education whereas "[tihe
biggest problem in this country . ..is with higher education
'1 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1973). For purposes of Title IX, educational institutions
include any public or private preschool, elementary school, or secondary school or any
institution of vocational, professional, or higher education.
2) 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975).
21 For legislative history, see 117 CONG. REc. 39,256 (1970) (remarks of Representa-
tive Green). See also HEW Memorandum, supra note 17. The direct statement of
HEW's interpretation appears at 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975).
2 Press Conference of Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, in Washington, D.C., June 3, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Press Conference].
3 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975). See, e.g., Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742,
477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207
(6th Cir. 1973); Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n., 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 289 N.E. 2d 495 (Ind. 1972).
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and there is now not one institution of higher learning which
is in compliance [with the final regulations] . . . . The dis-
crepancy between the amount of money being spent on men
and that on women is astronomical. 12 4 In addition, the four-
teenth amendment equal protection analysis limits judicial
inquiry to the scope delineated by Supreme Court cases rather
than permitting an absolute determination of what constitutes
equality of opportunity in athletics. Whether the enhanced
opportunity envisioned by Secretary Weinberger and equal
opportunity, as Title IX purports to provide, are the same is
uncertain. The prerequisite to resolution of this question is a
determination of the nature of equal opportunity for women in
athletics.
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: AN OVERVIEW
Most of the court cases brought by female athletes were
decided within the three-year time period between congres-
sional recognition of sexual discrimination in education2 and
the implementation of the Title IX regulations. 26 In the absence
of notice to state and local school officials that Title IX had
been passed and was applicable to them27 and without working
procedures under Title IX,218 the plaintiffs challenged rules bar-
24 Telephone inquiry, supra note 17.
2 Discrimination Against Women, supra note 3. These hearings, chaired by Edith
Green, were the first congressional recognition of sex discrimination in education. The
topic of athletics was not raised.
26 HEW Regs., 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1975). For thorough discussions of many of these
cases see Fabri and Fox, The Female High School Athlete and Interscholastic Sports,
4 J. LAW & ED. 285 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fabri and Fox]; Stroud, Sex-
Discrimination in High School Athletics, 6 IND. L. REV. 66 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Stroud]; Note, The Case for Equality in Athletics, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 370 (1973);
Note, Sex Discrimination in High School Athletics, 57 MINN. L. REV. 339 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination]; Note, Sex Discrimination in High School
Athletics Unreasonable, 19 N.Y.L.F. 166 (1973); Comment, Equality in Athletics: The
Cheerleader v. The Athlete, 19 S. Dak. L. Rev. 428 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Equality in Athletics]; Comment, Sex Discrimination in Interscholastic High School
Athletics, 25 SYRAcUsE L. REV. 535 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Female Athletics].
2 State and local school administrators and staff were not notified of Title IX
legislation until February 1973, although the measure was passed in June 1972. See
Women's Educational Equity, supra note 3, at 231.
1 Id. at 275: "[T]he charges we have filed against schools that stand in violation
of the law are yet to be investigated [due to the absence of regulatory guidelines]."
Statement of Ellen Morgan, Coordinator, Task Force on University Compliance, Prin-
ceton, N.J.
[Vol. 64
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ring girls from boys' athletic teams with the constitutional ar-
gument that such rules deny female athletes equal protection
of the law under the fourteenth amendment.29
The function of the equal protection clause is to insure
that a state classifying statute treats alike all those and only
those persons who are similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the statute.10 It is recognized that in order to achieve
a variety of legitimate ends, a government often must classify
its citizens into various groups and, on the basis of the classifi-
cation, treat one group differently than another.31 Two distinct
standards of review have evolved to determine whether such
unequal treatment is valid under the equal protection require-
ment. Permissive review, or the rational relationship test, is the
traditional standard. Under this approach, a court will defer
to the legislative judgment if there is a rational relationship
between a legitimate governmental purpose and the classifica-
tion.33 A court will not "cross-examine either actually or argu-
mentatively the mind of the. . . legislators nor question their
motives. '34 Only if the classifying criteria are "wholly unre-
lated" to the governmental purpose will the statute be over-
turned. The burden of showing the invalidity of the classifica-
tion rests on the person challenging it." "There is in effect a
presumption that the rule or program does not violate the equal
protection guarantee. '3 Active review, or "strict scrutiny," is
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "No state shall. . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
3 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886). For a comprehensive treatment
of equal protection, see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
31 Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954). See also Sex Discrimina-
tion, supra note 26, at 340.
12 Developments, supra note 30, at 1084-86.
See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The court does
not look for the probable "real" purpose but for a purpose that is legitimate.
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948).
For cases in which this standard was applied, see Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S.
357 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
1- See, e.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). See
generally, Developments, supra note 30, at 1077-87.
11 Sex Discrimination, supra note 26, at 342. This standard is commonly used in
fiscal and regulatory affairs and has been applied to social welfare programs as well.
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used when fundamental interests 3 or suspect classifications"
are involved. In such cases, the state has the burden of proving
that it had a "compelling interest" for creating the classifica-
tion;10 mere administrative convenience will not meet the bur-
den.'
In general, judicial application of the equal protection
clause to invalidate sex discrimination has developed slowly.4
As late as 1963, the Committee on Civil and Political Rights,
President's Commission on the Status of Women, noted: "In no
14th amendment case alleging discrimination on account of sex
has the United States Supreme Court held that a law classify-
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (voting); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (practice of religion);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (freedom of association); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal appeals when granted as a matter of right);
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (right to employment).
3' Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (wealth); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 663 (1948)
(nationality); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (alienage). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971)
(illegitimacy). Suspect classifications are those which historically have been used as a
technique for depriving a certain class of people of opportunities available to others.
1O Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967). See also Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(purpose is subject to "the most rigid scrutiny").
1' Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
12 See generally Getman, The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual
Equality, 1972 SUPREME COURT REV. 157; Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971-Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]; Johnson &
Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 675 (1971); Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal
Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499 (1971).
Until recently, classifications based on sex were almost always upheld. In Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), the Court upheld maximum working hours for women on
the basis that women required special treatment which the legislature could properly
provide. The Court based its holding partly on the physical capabilities of women. Id.
at 421. In Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948), the Court upheld a statute that
prohibited women from holding bartending licenses unless they were wives or daugh-
ters of male bar owners on the ground that there was a rational relationship between
the statute and the legitimate governmental interest in avoiding "moral and social
problems."
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ing persons on the basis of sex is unreasonable and therefore,
unconstitutional. 4 3 Although sex as a classification is cur-
rently subject to scrutiny by the courts under the equal protec-
tion doctrine," the Supreme Court has refused to grant sex the
strict scrutiny due a suspect status. 5 Since 1971, when the
Supreme Court decided Reed v. Reed,4" the Court's formula for
the equal protection analysis of dissimilar treatment of males
and females is that "A classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.'-"7 As a result of this hybrid basis for review," a rule
which treats males and females differently will be examined to
determine if it is actually accomplishing the purpose used to
justify its creation. However, the burden of proving that there
is no fair and substantial relation between the classification
and the object of the legislation remains with the plaintiff.49
13 Report, supra note 6, at 34.
" Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971); Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742,
477 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1973).
'1 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In this opinion, Justices White,
Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan found classifications based on sex to be inherently
suspect as invidious discrimination: "[W]e can only conclude that classifications
based on sex, like classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin are inher-
ently suspect and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at 688.
However, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Powell concurred only in
holding the sex-based statutory scheme unconstitutional, finding authority for this
conclusion in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which "did not add sex to the narrowly
limited group of classifications which are inherently suspect." 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell,
J., concurring). Rejection or ratification of the equal rights amendment was considered
more appropriate for determining whether classification by sex should require strict
scrutiny. Id. Justice Stewart agreed with Justices Burger, Blackmun, and Powell, but
on the grounds of "invidious discrimination." Justice Rehnquist dissented. See gener-
ally The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 57, 116-25 (1973). Compare
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) in which the California
Supreme Court designated sex a suspect classification: "Sex, like race and lineage, is
an immutable trait, a status into which the class members are locked by accident of
birth"; as a basis for classification, it "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform
.... " Id. at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340. This decision was handed down six months
before Reed.
' 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Id. at 76, citing Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
' For an excellent discussion of the hybrid model, see Gunther, supra note 42. He
sees an evolution of rationality scrutiny, as opposed to the strict strutiny or rational
relationship tests.
11 Id. Contra, Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th
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The Supreme Court has also refused to declare education
a fundamental interest." Therefore, while there has been a
consensus since 1954 as to the importance of education in
American life,5' plaintiffs cannot demand application of the
strict scrutiny test on this ground either. Because the primary
right to education is not recognized, the subsidiary rights to
physical education in the curriculum and to interscholastic
sports programs within that physical education curriculum are
not enforceable as fundamental interests worthy of strict judi-
cial scrutiny. 52 Given the difficulty of applying the ambiguous
equal protection standard used in sex discrimination cases and
the inability to assert the fundamental right to education, it is
not surprising that the cases involving women in athletics do
not articulate a clear standard as a basis for the decisions.13
Cir. 1973). This case shifted the burden of proof to the defendant: "We believe that in
view of the nature of the classification and the important interests of the plaintiffs
involved, the High School League has failed to demonstrate that the sex-based classifi-
cation fairly and substantially promotes the purposes of the League's rule."
" San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973): "Educa-
tion, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under the Federal
Constitution." Id. at 35.
11 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954): "Today, education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments . . . . In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity to an education." See also SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at
7: "Discrimination in education is one of the most damaging injustices women suffer.
It denies them equal education and equal employment opportunity, contributing to a
second class self image."
52 However, discrimination in high school interscholastic athletics has been recog-
nized as constituting discrimination in education. See Bunger v. Iowa High School
Athletic Ass'n, 197 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1972); Thompson v. Barnes, 200 N.W.2d 921
(Minn. 1972). See also Female Athletes, supra note 26, at 535, citing SPoRTs
ILLUSTRATED, May 28, 1973 at 88: "There may be worse (more socially serious) forms
of prejudice in the United States, but there is no sharper example of discrimination
today than that which operates against girls and women who take part in competitive
sports . .. .
1 Plaintiff-athletes have won the following cases: Brenden v. Independent School
Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (tennis, cross-country running and skiing);
Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973) (tennis); Reed v.
Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972) (golf); Haas v.
South Bend Community School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972) (golf). Suits decided
for the defendant are Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (swimming); Harris v. Illinois High School Ass'n, No. 72-25 (S.D. Ill., April 17,
1972) (tennis); Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 12-49-27
(Super Ct. of New Haven Co., Conn., March 19, 1971) (track); Gregorio v. Board of
Educ. of Asbury Park, No. A-1277-70 (Super Ct. of N.J., App. Div., April 5, 1971)
(tennis).
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR
ATHLETIC DISCRIMINATION SUITS
The challenges to segregated athletic programs have arisen
in two situations: (1) Girls have wanted to participate on boys'
teams when no girls' teams had been provided, and (2) girls
have sought to participate on boys' teams even when a girls'
team was offered. The plaintiffs' equal protection argument is
not that they have an absolute constitutional right to partici-
pate in interscholastic athletics, but that they have a right to
play if they qualify under the neutral criteria normally used to
select a team and that they can not be precluded from playing
solely because they are female. 4 Initially, the courts reacted
protectively, in keeping with the attitudes of the time. They
had difficulty accepting the fact that women were interested in
participating in sports at all. No precedent existed for applica-
tion of the equal protection clause to women's participation in
athletics, and as a result, the courts vacillated in their at-
tempts to determine what interests deserved equal protection.
A. Cases in Which Teams Are Not Provided for Women
Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic
Conference5 was one of the earliest cases to deal with the issue
of male and female athletic segregation. The court refused to
enjoin the enforcement of a rule forbidding the plaintiffs par-
ticipation on the track team. Because it applied the rational
relationship test, which is satisfied by finding any legitimate
state purpose related to the classification, the court made no
attempt to determine whether the classification bore a sub-
stantial relation to any legitimate objective of the rule. Instead,
the court found partial justification for the rule in the fact that
it reflected the customs and traditions of sports.56 Another ra-
11 Brief for Appellant at 71-75, Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 289
N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972).
No. 12-49-27 (Super Ct. of New Haven Co., Conn., March 29, 1971), appeal
dismissed, 295 A.2d 671 (Conn. 1972) (mem.); See Equality in Athletics, supra note
26, at 433 n. 32: "This dispute was settled by agreement. The Association agreed to
amend its regulations to permit girls to compete in noncontact sports where no team
existed for girls. ACLU Women's Rights Project, Legal Docket, docket number WR
1001 (Aug. 1973)."
11 The court took judicial notice that important athletic events always involve
1975]
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tionale for upholding the rule was the court's belief that compe-
tition between males and females would probably produce psy-
chological damage to members of both groups.57 Essentially,
the court based this theory on stereotyped images of men and
women:
[T]he present generation of our male population has not
become so decadent that boys will experience a thrill in de-
feating girls in running contests . . . .With boys vying with
girls in cross-country running and indoor track, the challenge
to win, and the glory of achievement, at least for many boys,
would lose incentive and become nullified. Athletic competi-
tion builds character in our boys. We do not need that kind
of character in our girls, the women of tomorrow."
The approach of the Hollander court was supplanted by
the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Reed v.
Reed,5 19 but Reed left gaps in the reasoning necessary to reach
the female athlete's legally protectable interest where no team
had been provided for her. Nevertheless, the implications fa-
vorable to women in Reed caused courts to examine more
closely the rules excluding women from athletic participation.
In Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp.,6" a
proven female athlete challenged a rule of the Indiana High
School Athletic Association which stated: "Boys and girls shall
not be permitted to participate in interschool athletic games as
mixed teams, nor shall boys' teams and girls' teams participate
segregated competition and observed: "Does this not signify that in the athletic world,
by tradition and custom, it was never contemplated as a matter of policy that males
and females be joined together on a team and compete with other teams or similar
groups so composed?" Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference,
No. 12-49-27, at 19-20 (Super. Ct. of New Haven Co., Conn., March 29, 1971).
" The theory is that in direct competition the girl would not be able to win and
therefore might be psychologically damaged; boys would lose incentive to win and
might be denied the opportunity for character building. See, e.g., Gregorio v. Board
of Educ. of Asbury Park, No. C-1988-69 (Super. Ct. of N.J., Ch. Div., Monmouth City,
April 13, 1970). Arguments concerning potential psychological damage have been con-
fusing and the testimony has been inconclusive. Even expert witnesses have not been
able to concur on who might be damaged. See generally Sex Discrimination, supra note
26 at 352; Female Athletes, supra note 26, at 551.
1 Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, No. 12-49-27, at
12 Super. Ct. of New Haven Co., Conn., (March 29, 1971).
19 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
eo 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972).
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against each other in interschool athletic contests."'" No golf
team for females was provided at the plaintiff's school. Al-
though she shot a qualifying score, the plaintiff was not permit-
ted to join the male team because of the Association rule. She
charged that the rule discriminated against her on the basis of
sex in violation of the equal protection clause. 2 The trial court
held that the rule was constitutionally valid. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the decision by a three to
two vote, an indication of judicial indecision on this issue. 3
The court, emphasizing that the problem of contact sports
was not at issue in this case,64 employed a reasonableness stan-
dard of review. 5 It considered two governmental interests
which could arguably be served by the rule: prevention of an
increase in the cost of administering interscholastic athletics,66
and protection of girls' athletic programs. 7 To support the con-
tention that allowing girls to play on boys' teams would have
an adverse effect on the development of girls' athletic pro-
grams, the court reasoned that if girls were permitted to try out
for boys' teams, it would necessarily follow that boys would
have to be allowed to try out for girls' teams. Because, as a
"Indiana High School Athletic Association By-Laws, Rule 9, § 7.
289 N.E.2d at 496.
Id. at 501.
' Id. at 498. Justice Hunter, speaking for the court: "Appellant concedes that a
male-female classification is reasonable insofar as it applies to sports necessarily in-
volving direct physical contact between the contestants. Appellant's challenge is di-
rected only to the validity of the rule's application to non-contact sports." However,
this is questionable in light of appellant's reply brief in which she stated: "The plaintiff
does not concede that there should be a dividing line or classification based on sex for
any type of athletic activity. It is true that the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant
from denying the high school girls the right to participate in interschool noncontact
sports, and it might be assumed . . . that she recognized the reasonable basis for
sexual classification in contact sports. But she does not. The idea of a girl participating
in a contact sport with boys is not yet acceptable." Appellant's Reply Brief at 11.
289 N.E.2d at 498.
' Stroud, supra note 26, at 667; Sex Discrimination, supra note 26, at 353. This
argument was advanced in Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258
(D. Neb. 1972); Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 12-49-27
(Super. Ct. of New Haven Co., Conn., March 19, 1971); Gregorio v. Board of Educ. of
Asbury Park, No. A-1277-70 (Super Ct. of N.J., App. Div., April 5, 1971).
17 Stroud, supra note 26, at 668-69; Sex Discrimination, supra note 26, at 354. This
argument was also used in Gregorio v. Board of Educ. of Asbury Park, No. A-1277-70
(Super. Ct. of N.J., App. Div., April 5, 1971) and Brenden v. Independent School Dist.
742, 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
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general rule, "males tend to possess a higher degree of athletic
ability in traditional sports offered by most schools,"6 they
would soon dominate both girls' and boys' teams. Therefore,
the court concluded that the rule appeared reasonable on its
face. The majority opinion went on, however, to note that:
"[A] rule or law which appears to be nondiscriminatory on its
face may nevertheless be struck down as a denial of equal pro-
tection if it is unreasonably discriminatory in its operation."69
In a case where only one program-for males-was provided,
difference in athletic ability was not a justifiable reason to deny
girls access to the boys' team. Four of the five Indiana justices
stated their belief that the existence of a "comparable" girls'
athletic program would make the rule valid under the equal
protection clause. 71
The Reed "fair and substantial relationship" standard of
review was fully applied in Brenden v. Independent School
District 742.71 Two exceptional female students whose schools
did not provide girls' teams in the noncontact sports of tennis,
cross-country running or cross-country skiing brought suit
challenging a Minnesota State High School League rule pro-
hibiting interscholastic competition between women and
men.7 The Eighth Circuit emphatically pointed out at the be-
ginning of its opinion that it would not decide whether separate
but equal teams for males and females would fulfill the respon-
sibilities of the schools73 or whether the League was justified in
prohibiting females from competing with males in contact
sports.74 The court limited its decision to whether the equal
protection clause permits the exclusion of qualified female ath-
letes from participation on the boys' team in the absence of any
program for girls.
The trial court had specifically found that the plaintiffs
" 289 N.E.2d at 499.
11 Id. at 500. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
70 289 N.E. 2d at 500.
1, 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
72 The rule in issue provided: "Girls shall be prohibited from participation in the
boys' interscholastic program either as a member of the boys' team or a member of
the girls' team playing the boys' team." 342 F. Supp. at 1227.
7 477 F.2d at 1295.
7 Id.
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were capable of competing with men in noncontact sports, that
the class of women, like the class of men, contains individuals
of widely different athletic abilities, and that in noncontact
sports, factors such as coordination, concentration, agility, and
timing are crucial to achieve success.75 Unpersuaded by the
argument that physical differences exist between the sexes
which preclude females from competing successfully with
males, the court held that the sex-based classification had no
fair and substantial relationship to the objective of the League
rule, which was "to insure that persons with similar qualifica-
tions [would] compete with each other."7 Given the plaintiffs'
proven athletic ability and the absence of an athletic program
equal to that provided for males, the females were entitled to
an "individualized determination" of their ability to compete
before being denied interscholastic competition.7
B. A Case In Which Teams Are Provided for Women
Bucha v. Illinois High School Association78 is one of a small
number of athletic discrimination cases in which teams were
provided for both sexes.79 Despite this important factual differ-
ence, the court was faced with the same type of evidence and
many of the same arguments as had been presented in the
single team cases. Bucha was a class action challenging the
Association's rules setting limitations on women's, but not
men's, athletic contests ° and forbidding mixed interscholastic
competition.8 The plaintiffs, both outstanding athletes, as-
serted the right to equal educational opportunity 2 and the
Is 342 F. Supp. at 1233. No objective evidence was introduced as to this claim.
Accord, Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969):
"Technique is hardly a function of sex." See Sex Discrimination, supra, note 26, at
363.
7' Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1302 (8th Cir. 1973).
71 Id. If the purpose of the rule was to insure that persons having the same
qualifications compete with each other, women cannot be barred from competition
with males on the basis of an assumption about the qualifications of women as a class.
The court cited Sex Discrimination, supra note 26.
351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
7' See Equality in Athletics, supra note 26, at 434-35.
351 F. Supp. at 71, nn. 1 & 2.
Id. at 71.
12 The plaintiffs cited Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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right to equal treatment regardless of sex, unless the Associa-
tion could demonstrate a compelling state interest.83 The court
rejected the compelling interest test, interpreting Reed as a
rejection of sex as a suspect classification and an endorsement
of the traditional rational relationship test.84 In view of the
"fair and substantial relationship" language in Reed, it ap-
pears that the Bucha court misinterpreted the Supreme
Court's intent to establish an intermediate standard of review
for sex classifications. Despite this possible misinterpretation,
the case indicates the approach that courts are likely to follow
in a situation where teams are provided for both males and
females. This court resolved the issue in favor of the Associa-
tion, finding a rational basis for sexual segregation in
physiological differences and probable male domination of
both sports programs. These same rationales were articulated
in Brenden and Haas, but were not decisive in those cases due
to the complete absence of female sports programs.
A potential argument based on Title IX was overlooked by
both the plaintiffs and the court. The plaintiffs did cite sex
discrimination decisions dealing with equal employment op-
portunity" under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act"6 as
analogous to the case at hand. However, the court rejected
them as "inapposite" because it viewed Title VII as a legisla-
tive exception to application of the rational relationship test in
sex discrimination cases.
In enacting Title VII Congress has made the legislative judg-
ment that employment is too important an interest to be
protected solely by the equal protection clause of the Consti-
tution .... But ... [n]either the State of Illinois nor the
federal Congress has enacted a statute applicable to high
school sports that conceivably resembles Title VII's concern
with equal employment opportunity.87
Bucha was decided November 15, 1972; Title IX, which
13 The plaintiffs cited Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1971).
351 F. Supp. at 74.
Id. at 75.
42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1970).
351 F. Supp. at 75.
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had been enacted in June of that year, could have supported
the plaintiffs' analogy.8
C. Summary of Athletic Sex Discrimination in the Courts
An examination of these representative cases indicates a
noticeable trend toward recognition that "[t]he female high
school athlete has a legally protectable interest in the benefits
of an interscholastic sports program where one is provided for
the male athletes by the school system." 9 However, such an
interest is less certain where programs have been provided for
both sexes.
The usual inequity between the programs is irrelevant. 0
The courts look to a hierarchy of concerns in their determina-
tion of whether a female has been denied equal protection by
a rule or policy which denies her the opportunity to compete
against males. A plaintiff bringing such a suit has the greatest
likelihood of success if there is no women's program at her
school for the sport in which she wishes to participate, espe-
cially if that sport does not involve contact. Although courts
express concern that the physical and psychological differences
between the sexes will create an inequality in their competi-
tion, the same courts will not bar females from the desired
athletic activity altogether.9' However, when a female program
in the challenged sport is provided or when the sport is one
which involves contact, or even when the suit is a class action
-' Lack of notice to state school officials that Title IX had been passed by Congress
and was applicable to their programs, see note 27, supra, probably extended to the
judiciary as well. In addition, Congress' failure to specify whether athletics were to be
included in the educational activities to be regulated might have been partly to blame.
A law journal article published in April, 1975, Fabri and Fox, supra note 26, indicated
that there were no reported decisions basing the complaint on a violation of Title IX
as of that time. A note to that article did mention a suit filed in Kalamazoo, Michigan,
based on Title IX. "IT]he Education Amendments envision an administrative rem-
edy rather than a judicial one," the authors hypothesize as an explanation for the
virtual nonexistence of suits brought under Title IX. Id. at 298.
11 Id. at 286.
91 See Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973);
Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972), afl'd,
477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp.
258 (D. Neb. 1972). Contra, Harris v. Illinois High School Ass'n, Civil No. 72-75 (S.D.
Ill., April 17, 1972).
" Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Ind. 1972).
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rather than a suit by an exceptional female athlete, courts
often find enough reason behind the rule barring mixed compe-
tition to deny the relief sought. Usually in cases which involve
one or more of these factors, the justification of physical differ-
ences carries more weight.2 Although conflicting testimony as
to the existence and importance of physical differences appears
in the cases, the issue remains unresolved, especially in regard
to the contact versus noncontact sport distinction. 3
The courts' adherence to the equal protection analysis es-
tablished by the Supreme Court for cases involving alleged sex
discrimination does not resolve the critical question: What is
the most equitable athletic program? Whether "separate but
equal" athletic programs are adequate under the equal protec-
tion doctrine has never been directly addressed. 4 Segregation
22 "Most female athletes do not possess the same athletic ability as men, and the
rule [segregating male competitors from female competitors] accordingly groups ath-
letes by ability to avoid the problems caused by competition among mismatched
opponents." Sex Discrimination, supra note 26, at 356.
13 Plaintiffs bringing suit to challenge Little League rules have provided courts the
only direct confrontation with a contact sport. In Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Confer-
ence, 364 F. Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa. 1973), the court dismissed the complaint, even
though no comparable program existed for girls, on the ground that baseball's contact
sport status provided a rational basis for the discriminatory classification. The court
took judicial notice that baseball is a contact sport due to game situations like the
stolen base, wild pitch, and play-at-the-plate. Id. at 1216. Three months later, New
Jersey's Division on Civil Rights decided to permit girls to play Little League baseball.
National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., Docket No. DJO
55B-0493 (Dep't. of Laws & Pub. Safety Div. on Civil Rights of N.J., Nov. 7, 1973).
Thus, stereotyped ideas about ubiquitous physical differences are beginning to break
down.
"Though the majority of women have yet to overcome the physical differences that
preclude effective participation with men, there can be no doubt that there are inter-
ested women who are as qualified to compete in contact as well as noncontact sports
as most men." Female Athletics, supra note 26, at 550. Evidence of the female's inter-
est in contact sports is the existence of organized programs in baseball, basketball,
boxing, ice hockey, lacrosse, professional football, roller derby, and soccer. SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, June 4, 1973, at 46. The Army is currently compiling statistics, on the
basis of more women undergoing basic training, which should provide helpful infor-
mation in this area of physical differences. Interview with Nancy Ray, Affirmative
Action Officer, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky [hereinafter cited as
Interview].
2" In analyzing whether "separate but equal" athletic programs are adequate,
attention must be given to the different ways in which male and female sports are
conducted. Usually the women's distances in swimming and track are shorter than the
men's; women frequently experience greater restriction on the number of events in
which they may participate; women are often discouraged from playing before crowds.
Although the "separate but equal" doctrine was struck down in Brown v. Board of
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of activity has the virtue of preserving opportunities for the
majority of women, but it fails to accommodate the exceptional
female athlete who would rather compete against men. If rele-
gated to a sex-separated team, it is arguable that she will en-
counter less competition and receive less training than her abil-
ity deserves.95 Separate but equal has generally been proven to
be separate and unequal in athletics.96 At present, equal pro-
tection of the law is a more limited concept than equal oppor-
tunity in the area of athletics.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN EDUCATION:
TITLE IX
Before 1970, there were no laws forbidding sex discrimina-
tion against women in education.9" Beginning in 1971, however,
a massive effort was initiated to statutorily eliminate sex dis-
crimination. Congress first addressed the problem of sex dis-
crimination in education in the 1970 hearings before the Spe-
cial Subcommittee on Education chaired by Representative
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that case dealt with race, a suspect classification. "Sepa-
rate but equal" is not necessarily invalid with regard to athletics, which is not afforded
the suspect or fundamental interest status.
91 Sex Discrimination, supra note 26, at 369. See also Kirstein v. Rectors and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970), in which the prestige
factor attached to an all-male school caused the facility to be considered unequalled
by any other school in the system. The system was declared unequal in fact and the
school was compelled to admit women. In the area of athletics, there is much prestige
in being a male athlete but the amount of prestige attached to a female athlete is
questionable. Fewer opportunities for training and competition are part of the basis
for the arguably lesser prestige afforded female athletes.
11 Female Athletics, supra note 26, at 553: "For example, sex separated pro-
grams may result in the loss of educational and economic benefits. Athletic ability has
proven to be an enormous vehicle for obtaining a college education, but the ratio
between male and female athletic scholarships is almost 1000 to one." SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 28, 1973, at 91-92. Until women have access to the same facilities,
coaching and competition, they will continue to be disadvantaged in this respect.
" At that time, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1,
which forbids discrimination in employment, exempted educational institutions. Title
VI of the same Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, prohibited discrimination by race, color and
national origin against beneficiaries (i.e., students) in federally assisted programs. The
Equal Pay Act did not cover executive, administrative and professional employees
until July, 1972. In addition, there had been no Congressional hearings on the Equal
Rights Amendment. See also Dunkle, Women Students: The End of Second Class
Citizenship, Women's Educational Equity, supra note 3, at 41-48.
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Edith Green. 8 These hearings, roughly coinciding with the be-
ginning of the courts' struggle to apply equal protection stan-
dards to sex discrimination, marked the initiation of a congres-
sional effort to shape a national policy to end sex discrimina-
tion in all educational institutions at all levels. Congress ex-
tended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 91 which had
proved to be an effective weapon against sex discrimination in
employment, to include all educational institutions. Congress
amended the Equal Pay Act of 1963100 to cover executive, ad-
ministrative, and professional employees, including all faculty
members. The Public Health Service Act'01 was amended to
equalize admission. standards between the sexes in all health
profession training programs, thereby increasing the opportun-
ity for women to become doctors. Congress also attacked the
problem directly by enacting Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments Act of 197212 to cover all aspects of student and em-
ployee treatment in educational institutions.
A. Legislative History of Title IX
The legislation that became Title IX was first introduced
on April 6, 1971, in the House of Representatives by Represent-
ative Edith Green.103 Comparable legislation was introduced in
98 Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16,098 Before The Special Subcomm. on
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
Over 1,200 pages of testimony on the subject of sex discrimination were gathered at
the hearing.
" Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (1971), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1
(1964).
'® Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title IX, § 906(b)(1), 86 Stat. 373 (June 23, 1972).
,0, Pub. L. No. 92-157, § 110, 85 Stat. 431 (1971), amending 42 U.S.C. § 295h-9
(1963).
,02 Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title IX, §901, 86 Stat. 373 (June 23, 1972).
"' 111 CONG. REc. 9822 (1971) (remarks of Representative Green). There was no
mention of athletics at this time, but recommended provisions as to single-sex and
religious institutions were contained in the final draft. The bill was introduced as Title
X of H.R. 7248, the Higher Education Act of 1971, to amend Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq. [hereinafter Title VII. Title VI essentially
prohibited federal agencies from granting federal financial assistance to those who
discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Title IX is similar to Title
VI in language, but differs in that Title IX applies to discrimination based on sex, is
limited to education programs and activities and includes employment in educational
institutions. Since the language of Title IX so closely parallels that of Title VI, in the
;absence of specific Congressional indications to the contrary, HEW has interpreted
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the Senate by Senator Birch Bayh.14 Senator Bayh's amend-
ment came as an afterthought to other considerations and con-
cerned itself with three major provisions: (1) Nondiscrimi-
nation by recipient institutions in the areas of admissions and
benefits, (2) implementation measures, and (3) the necessity of
a nationwide survey of both public and private higher educa-
tional institutions to determine the extent to which equality of
educational opportunity was being denied to citizens of the
United States on the basis of sex.' 5 The only mention of athlet-
Title IX consistently with interpretations of Title VI in similar areas. Under Title VI,
the courts have consistently considered athletics sponsored by educational institutions
to be an integral part of the institution's education program. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24, 134
(1975), citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
Due to current distress among some members of Congress concerning the athletic
provisions of Title IX, the bonds between Title IX and Title VI are being repudiated.
See 121 CoNG. REC. S 9713 (daily ed. June 5, 1975) (remarks of Senator Helms).
"04 Senator Bayh introduced S. 659, Calendar No. 342, a bill to amend the Higher
Education Act of 1965, the Vocational Education Act of 1963, and related acts, to
guarantee educational opportunity to women.
While we have always looked to education as the ultimate answer to our
national problems of poverty, discrimination, and development, never before
have we sought to embody this belief in substantive public policy. Now we
are trying to establish access to higher education as a basic Federal right
... . But as we seek to help those who have been the victims of economic
discrimination, let us not forget those Americans who have been subject to
other, more subtle but still pernicious forms of discrimination. . . . Today
I am submitting an amendment which will guarantee that women, too, enjoy
the educational opportunity every American deserves.
117 CONG. REC. 30,155 (1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh). In support of Senator Bayh's
amendment, Senator McGovern urged his colleagues "to prohibit Federal funding of
sex discrimination." 117 CONG. REC. 30,158 (1971) (remarks of Senator McGovern). He
continued: "While amending individual bills in no way reduces the need for the consti-
tutional (Equal Rights) amendment, it does provide at least a step-by-step attack
giving women equality in at least those areas covered by the specific bills." He also
noted the conclusion drawn from Mrs. Green's hearings, Discrimination Against
Women, supra note 3, that the Office of Education, i.e., the Government, by its
policies, its programs and its guidelines, fails to condemn measures arbitrarily restrict-
ing potential women students.
'15 117 CONG. Rzc. 30,404 (1971). Since Senator Bayh introduced S.659 at the close
of the day, discussion of the amendment was postponed until the following day. On
August 6, 1971, several Senators expressed their concerns as to what the amendment
would require. There was talk of quotas, agreedly discriminatory in regard to admis-
sions to medical schools, but less consensus about admission to religious institutions.
Senator Bayh explained: "I do not think it is wise for the Congress of the United States
to determine whether or not men or women should be priests, preachers, or religious
figures in any church. That is for the church itself to decide." 117 CONG. REc. 30,407
(1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
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ics at that time arose from Senator Dominick's concern regard-
ing the scope of the amendment.' 6 Senator Bayh explained:
I [do not] feel it mandates the desegregation of the football
fields. What we are trying to do is provide equal access for
women and men students to the educational process and the
extracurricular activities in a school, where there is not a
unique facet such as football involved."7
After limited debate, the amendment was rejected as nonger-
mane. 0 '
Undaunted, Senator Bayh reintroduced the same amend-
ment at the beginning of the 92d Congress as the Women's
Educational Equality Act.' 0 Two months later, before action
on this bill, the Higher Education Act of 1971 was referred to
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare."0 Senator Bayh
reintroduced his amendment"' but specifically excepted the
controversial topic of admission to military and religious insti-
tutions."12 In the meantime, the House bill was undergoing sim-
There was also discussion of how compliance would be assured. The notion at that
time was that hearings, notice and normal administrative procedures would be avail-
able to complainants, but the end result would be to cut off all aid that comes through
HEW. When questioned closely on this topic, Senator Bayh indicated that he imagined
that the Secretary of HEW would use only reasonable leverage against the institution
necessary under the circumstances and that assistance to individual students would
not be cut off. 117 CONG. REc. 30,408 (1971).
,00 117 CONG. REc. 30,407 (1971).
,o' Id. Mr. Dominick's response: "If I may say so, I would have had much more
fun playing college football if it had been integrated."
I Shortly after this exchange, Senator Thurmond noted that he was one of the
authors of the equal rights amendment and then made a point of order that the
amendment was not germane. The Senator was concerned that the amendment had
not been examined in any committee. 117 CONG. REC. 30,412 (1971) (remarks of Sena-
tor Thurmond). The Chair agreed and, after some further discussion, ruled that Sena-
tor Bayh's amendment was not germane to the bill. 117 CONG. REc. 30,415 (1971).
'1 Id. at 32,476: A bill to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex by institu-
tions of higher education.
,,0 Id. at 43,080.
' Id. at 43,081.
1,2 Senator Bayh described his amendment as dealing with three basically differ-
ent types of discrimination: Discrimination in admissions, discrimination of available
services or studies once students are admitted, and discrimination in employment
within an institution, as a faculty member or otherwise. "In the area of employment,
we permit no exceptions. In the area of services, once a student is accepted within an
institution, we permit no exceptions. [As to] admissions policies of private secondary
and primary schools, [tihey would be excepted." 118 CONG. REC. 5,812 (1972).
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ilar debate."' Here, too, equality of opportunity for employ-
ment in educational institutions presented no problems, but in
the area of admissions there was much debate."' The topic of
athletics was never raised in the discussion of the legislation.
The legislation finally became law on June 23, 1972, as
Title IX to the Education Amendments of 1972.115 The statute
provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
. . "6 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) was directed to fashion implementing regulations for
the enforcement of Title IX.
B. Development of Regulations for Title IX
The express purpose of Title IX was to close the gap in the
laws protecting women from biased educational policies." 7 It
was unclear, however, whether Congress intended the Act to
reach the subject of athletics. HEW made the controversial
decision to include athletics within the scope of the regulations
for several reasons. First, the language of Title IX parallels that
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,118 and since there
were no specific indications to the contrary, HEW tried to in-
terpret Title IX consistently with Title VI."'1 Second, the courts
have consistently considered athletics sponsored by educa-
tional institutions to be an integral part of the educational
program and, consequently, covered by Title VI."'2 HEW also
, See 117 CONG. REC. 37,784 (1971) (remarks of Senator Quie).
" Id. at 39,248 (remarks of Representative Erlenborn). Mr. Erlenborn offered an
amendment to exclude undergraduate admissions, " . . . so that there would be no
question of quota or governmental determination of any degree as to undergraduate
admissions but we would still require equal and complete access to the graduate school,
the entry to the professions." That amendment was passed in the House. Id. at 39,261.
"' 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1973).
1,6 Id.
,, 117 CONG. REc. 30,400 (1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
"1 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.
"' Press Conference, supra note 22. See also 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975).
Iz2 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971);
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 891 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd
en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub. nom. United States v. Caddo
Parrish Bd. of Educ., 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
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considered the cases which challenged rules prohibiting compe-
tition between men and women in high school athletics as a
violation of the equal protection clause. Those cases explicitly
recognized interscholastic sports as an integral part of the edu-
cation process.'2' Finally, indications of congressional intent to
have athletics included in the implementing provisions of Title
IX'2 2 strengthened HEW's resolve to provide regulations for
equal opportunity in athletics for women.
On June 20, 1974 the Office for Civil Rights of HEW
(OCR) gave notice that it intended to add Part 86 to the
departmental regulation in order to effectuate Title IX.' 23 In-
terested persons were given until October 15, 1974 to submit
written comments, suggestions, or objections regarding the pro-
posed regulation. OCR received almost 10,000 such com-
ments.' 24 The process of sifting through the opinions and
suggestions took over six months. Although the athletics and
physical education sections of the regulations comprise only a
small part of the document, the emphasis on these areas of
education assumed large proportions for those writing the regu-
lations,125 in part because many of the comments expressed
concern that HEW was going beyond its authority in its regula-
tion of this field of activity.' 26 The final regulations reflect sig-
nificant changes incorporated due to the public response.'"
"' Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1297-99 (8th Cir.
1973); Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69,74 (N.D. Ill. 1972); cf. Reed
v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258, 262 (D. Neb. 1972) and Haas
v. South Bend Community Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Ind. 1972).
,2 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 note (Supp. 1975).
45 C.F.R. § 86 (1974).
'2 Press Conference, supra note 22.
" Press Conference, supra note 22, at 7: "With athletics, which is without ques-
tion the most important issue before the American people today, based on the com-
ments we received . . "
12 See 121 CONG. REC. 13,175 (daily ed. July 21, 1975). Senator Jesse Helms (R.
N.C.) introduced S. 2146, the Equal Educational Opportunity Amendments of 1975:
The bill provides that Title IX shall apply only to education programs and activities
which directly receive federal financial assistance and that such "education programs
and activities" shall mean only those programs and activities which are an integral
part of the required curriculum of an educational institution. Thus intercollegiate
athletics and the like would be excluded from coverage of Title IX. 121 CONo. REC. S
13,176 (1975).
I" One change beyond the scope of this paper mandates that each recipient set
up a self evaluation procedure which will examine the institution's policies and modify
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Provisions concerning physical education and athletics are in-
cluded in the final regulations,'28 but indecision on how to im-
them to comply with the regulations. However, elementary schools have been given
one year and secondary schools and universities three years to effect changes in their
physical education and athletics departments. There is some question concerning the
enforcement procedures to be directed against the institutions by HEW during that
time. In addition, on June 4, 1975, HEW published a proposed new procedural regula-
tion, 45 C.F.R. § 81 (1975), which will change their reactive, complaint-oriented en-
forcement to an approach which will attempt to identify and eliminate systematic
discrimination. HEW claimed this change in procedure is necessary because "we just
can't set ourselves up to handle" the large number of complaints already being re-
ceived as the regulatory agency for several other laws on discrimination. If people want
to continue to submit complaints, HEW will be glad to receive them as an indication
of the types of discrimination being continued, but the person submitting the com-
plaint will no longer be entitled to a hearing and review. HEW will advise the individ-
ual of the prospect of HEW scheduling a review of the complained-of institution within
the next 12 months; if no such review is scheduled during that time, HEW will advise
the individual as to other sources of relief, such as the courts, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, state Human Rights Commissions, and the Human Rela-
tions Agencies that have enforcement powers. HEW will also inform complainants of
the grievance procedures which are required by the regulations to be established at the
recipient institutions themselves. Press Conference, supra note 22. How these changes
will affect individual recipient compliance is difficult to predict at this time. In addi-
tion, HEW will encourage individuals to bring suit in federal district courts for a
violation of Title IX rather than relying on HEW enforcement procedures. Formerly,
a plaintiff had to show that she had exhausted her administrative remedies before she
could bring suit; under the proposed procedural regulation, there are no administrative
remedies to pursue. Telephone inquiry, supra note 24. However individuals might be
less likely to bring suit to demand equality of athletic opportunity due to the financial
burden.
On August 1, 1975, Senators Bayh, Case, Brooke and 50 of their colleagues submit-
ted Senate Resolution 235 which would require HEW to withdraw its proposed proce-
dural regulations and instead augment its Office of Civil Rights. See 121 CONG. REC.
S 14,947 (daily ed. August 1, 1975) (scathing remarks of Senator Bayh). The resolution
was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.
I" Final Title IX Regulation Implementing Education Amendments of 1972 Pro-
hibiting Sex Discrimination in Education, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,137 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as HEW Regs.].
§ 86.34 Access to course offerings
(b) This section does not prohibit grouping of students in physical
education classes and activities by ability as assessed by objective standards
of individual performance developed and applied without regard to sex.
(c) This section does not prohibit separation of students by sex within
physical education classes or activities during participation in wrestling,
boxing, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports, the purpose
or major activity of which involves bodily contact.
(d) Where use of a single standard of measuring skill or progress in a
physical education class has an adverse effect on members of one sex, the
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plement equality of opportunity in these areas is evidenced by
the many changes made after the tentative guidelines were
issued October 9, 197329 and by the uncertainty as to what
recipient shall use appropriate standards which do not have such effect.
§ 86.41 Athletics.
(a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from an-
other person or otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by recipient, and no re-
cipient shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph
(a) of this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for
members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competi-
tive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipi-
ent operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one sex,
• . . and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously been
limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out for the team
offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For the purpose of this
part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football,
basketball, and other sports, the purpose or major activity of which involves
bodily contact.
(c) Equal opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors inter-
scholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal
athletic opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining whether
equal opportunities are available the Director will consider, among other
factors:
(i) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(ii) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(iii) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(iv) Travel and per diem allowance;
(v) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(vi) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(vii) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(viii) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(ix) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(x) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal expenditures for
male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors separate teams will not
constitute noncompliance with this section, but the Director may consider the failure
to provide necessary funds for teams of one sex in assessing equality of opportunity
for members of each sex.
'" Proposed Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare Regulations to effectuate
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,232 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as HEW Proposed Regs.].
§ 86.34 Access to education program or activity.
(a) Course Offerings. A recipient shall not provide any course or other-
wise carry out any of its education program or activity separately on the basis
of sex, or require or refuse participation therein by any of its students on such
basis, including health, physical education . ...
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constitutes compliance under these regulations. 130
IV. THE REGULATIONS
The final Title IX regulations regarding athletics posited
that interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athlet-
§ 86.38 Athletics.
(a) General. Except as provided in this section, no person shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be
treated differently from another person, or otherwise be discriminated
against in any athletic program or activity operated by a recipient, and no
recipient shall provide any such program or activity separately on such basis.
In complying with this paragraph, a recipient shall not discriminate on the
basis of sex in selection of sports in which it offers instruction or other
activities.
(b) Determination of student interest. A recipient which operates or
sponsors athletics shall determine at least annually, using a method to be
selected by the recipient which is acceptable to the Director, in what sports
members of each sex would desire to compete.
(c) Affirmative efforts. A recipient which operates or sponsors athletic
activities shall, with regard to members of a sex for which athletic opportuni-
ties previously have been limited, make affirmative efforts to:
(1) Inform members of such sex of the availability for them
of athletic opportunities equal to those available for members of
the other sex and of the nature of those opportunities and
(2) Provide support and training activities for members of
such sex designed to imp:ove and expand their capabilities and
interests to participate in such opportunities.
(d) A recipient which operates or sponsors athletics shall make affirm-
ative efforts to provide athletic opportunities in such sports and through such
teams as will most effectively equalize such opportunities for members of
both sexes, taking into consideration the determination made pursuant to
paragraph (b) of this section.
(e) Separate teams. A recipient which operates or sponsors separate
teams for members of each sex shall not discriminate on the basis of sex
therein in the provision of necessary equipment or supplies for each team,
or in any other manner.
(f) Expenditures. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to re-
quire equal aggregate expenditures for athletics for members of each sex.
For a discussion of Title IX in its entirety based on the proposed regulations see Buck
and Orleans, Sex Discrimination-A Bar to a Democratic Education: Overview of Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 6 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1973).
"I Uncertainty is evidenced by the fact that the following questions are not di-
rectly answered in the regulations:
What is the remedy?
Is it a cut-off of all federal funds?
Are athletic scholarships to be determined by need? Or by athletic ability?
(For men to receive athletic scholorships, need is not a factor).
What is "comparable"?
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ics, defined only as athletic programs and activities in the 1973
proposed version, be operated without discrimination on the
basis of sex."' Except for the more specific definition, this re-
quirement is unchanged from the proposed 1973 regulations.'32
However, the remainder of the athletics section has been signif-
icantly modified. The proposed regulations required that no
recipient of federal funds could provide physical education
classes or any athletic activity separately on the basis of sex.'1
Due in part to the public reaction to this proposal, the final
regulations treat contact sports as a separate classification and
allow each school to exercise its own discretion with regard to
such sports.' 34 Consequently, the interpretive problems posed
by the final regulations involve only noncontact sports in phys-
ical education activities and competitive athletics.
The final regulations do not require coeducational physical
education classes. An institution may conduct segregated
physical instruction if the separation is justified by "objective
standards of individual performance developed and applied
without regard to sex.' 3 The objective standard required by
the regulations can be illustrated by an example involving run-
ning. A school might devise a program whereby all those who
could run a mile in six minutes or less would be grouped in one
physical education class. All those who run a mile in 6 to 12
minutes would be in another class, and those who take longer
than 12 minutes would be in a third group. The grouping would
be made totally on the basis of ability without regard to sex.
Given current differences in interest and ability, this might
mean that the first group would be all male, the third group
all female, and the middle group coeducational. Since the clas-
What is the standard of reasonableness?
How is HEW going to deal with all this?
Interview, supra note 93.
ni HEW Regs. § 86.41(a), supra note 128.
2 HEW Proposed Regs. § 86.38(a), supra note 129.
'3 HEW Proposed Regs. §§ 86.34(a), 86.38(a), supra note 129.
13 HEW Regs. §§ 86.34(c), 86.41(b), supra note 128.
13 HEW Regs. § 86.34(b), supra note 128. However HEW's analysis of the objec-
tive standard requirement may raise more questions than it solves, for it posits classifi-
cations based upon expectations of achievement each athlete can reasonably meet,
based on individual abilities. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975). The analysis seems to
present a subjective standard rather than the objective one required by the regulations.
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sifications would be totally ability oriented, an institution
would be justified in providing activities segregated in this
manner. However, the exceptional female athlete would not be
precluded from an appropriate level of competition. This result
satisfies a concern expressed in many of the comments to the
proposed regulations that individuals of both sexes would not
be able to learn and practice skills with others on the same level
of ability.
The final regulations, like the proposed regulations, state
the general proposition that there can be no sexually segregated
teams in competitive athletics. If only one team is maintained,
individuals of the sex usually excluded from the team must be
given an opportunity to compete for a position on that team. 38
However, the final regulations provide a method by which in-
stitutions can evade the mandate of this general rule by allow-
ing segregated teams when selection is based on competitive
skill. This exception implies that a school can avoid allowing
a female on the male team, regardless of the female's ability,
simply by providing sex-segregated teams in that particular
sport and utilizing the usual criterion, skill, to select the best
athletes for such teams.
The proposed regulations required all educational institu-
tions sponsoring athletic programs to make an annual determi-
nation of the activities desired by each sex and whether such
activities should be provided by separate or integrated
teams. 37 Because the comments to this provision indicated the
belief that institutions would be required to take an annual poll
of student interest,' 31 the final regulations demand only that
institutions select "sports and levels of competition which
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of both
sexes."' 39 The silence of the regulation enables an institution to
establish its own reasonable method for ascertaining "the in-
terests and abilities of both sexes."
A burden of affirmative action, requiring all educational
institutions to inform individuals of the available competitive
'' HEW Regs. § 86.34(b), supra note 128.
,' 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975).
'' Press Conference, supra note 22.
" HEW Regs. § 86.41(c)(i), supra note 129.
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athletic opportunities, was imposed by the proposed regula-
tions.'4 0 This provision was deleted in the final regulations as
being inconsistent with § 86.3, which requires only that an
institution, upon a finding of past discrimination, remedy the
effects of that discrimination. If no past discrimination is
found, affirmative efforts may be undertaken to correct the
conditions which resulted in limited participation by one sex.'41
Much controversy has surrounded the issue of funding,
which was not addressed in the proposed regulations. The final
regulations do not consider unequal funding for the members
of each sex to be a failure per se to provide equal opportunity.4 2
"Clearly, it is possible for equality of opportunity to be pro-
vided without exact equality of expenditure. However, neces-
sary funds for women's teams will be considered." ' This raises
the question of the sufficiency of expenditures for female
teams. "Traditionally young women . . . have not been inter-
ested in sports activity."'44 At present there is a gross disparity
in the expenditures for male and female athletic programs. '45
Equalization of those expenditures will depend upon the inter-
est in participating in sports which is generated among fem-
ales.'46 While the number of female athletes remains small, the
110 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975).
Id.
,12 HEW Regs. § 86.41(c), supra note 128.
1 Press Conference, supra note 22.
' Fabri and Fox, supra note 26, at 296.
", K. DECROW, SEXIST JUSTICE 294 (1974):
In school systems throughout the country, supported by taxes from par-
ents of both daughters and sons, there are huge amounts spent on boys'
athletics, teams, equipment, and practically nothing spent on the girls. Not
only does this deprive young women of the opportunity to develop their
bodies, it has enormous image consequences.
The cheerleader cheers, while the players play. Girls learn, at a very
early age, that their role is to sit on the sidelines or, at best, to cheer for the
boys. This pattern is continued into adult life. Women in professional athlet-
ics receive unequal pay, unequal prize money, unequal status, unequal pro-
motional opportunities and . . . the most biased media coverage . ...
'' Press Conference, supra note 22, at 18:
[Y]ou may have a lot fewer people participating in one sport. If there
is some institution where there is sufficient interest in having a separate girls'
football team, the institution would provide it. But it would be perfectly silly
to say that they had to provide precisely the same total amount of money
for 25 or 50 girls who want to try out for football, as opposed to a full scale
operation . . ..
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disparity between the funding of male and female sports activi-
ties is allowed under the regulations.
The same reasoning holds for athletic scholarships. 147 The
HEW regulations require that schools provide reasonable op-
portunities for athletic scholarships for members of each sex in
proportion to the number of students of each sex participating
in interscholastic or intercollegiate teams.4 8 Nonetheless, it is
in the area of financial equity that HEW received most com-
plaints' and, on the basis of newspaper quotations, it appears
many people do not understand what is mandated.'50 While the
[E]quality of opportunity does not necessarily require equal expendi-
tures. It might require more for a women's team. It might require much
more, because there would be more participants and a heavier schedule, and
they might not have any facilities and they might have to build some ....
This is not to say that it can always be less or anything of the kind. It
is to try to get a realistic look at what is desired. And, the result desired is
to try to eliminate what is obviously at present some discrimination against
women in athletics. It is not to require a ridiculous result that just breeds a
lot of public opposition, and does not achieve that result.
" HEW Regs. § 86.37(c).
(c) Athletic scholarships.
(1) To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholarships or
grants-in-aid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards for
members of each sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex
participating in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics.
(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for members of each
sex may be provided as part of separate athletic teams for members of each
sex to the extent consistent with this paragraph and § 86.41 of this part.
I' Id.
, Press Conference, supra note 22. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
proposed that the money earned by revenue producing intercollegiate sports be ex-
empted from coverage under the regulations. However, this point had been taken up
earlier, and rejected. Senator John Tower introduced an amendment on the floor of
the Senate to this end. 120 CONG. REc. 58,488 (daily ed. May 20, 1974). The "Tower
Amendment" was deleted in the conference committee and replaced by the "Javits
Amendment", which became § 844 of Pub. L. No. 93-380, mandating that Title IX
regulations include "reasonable provisions" covering intercollegiate athletics. The
issue is unsettled, however, for two resolutions have been offered in Congress to amend
the Regulations with respect to intercollegiate sports. Telephone inquiry, supra note
24.
1' Louisville Courier-Journal, July 24, 1975, §C (Sports), at 5:
Penn State Coach Joe Paterno and five of the nation's top college players
spoke out in Atlanta yesterday against strict enforcement of a new U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare rule regarding female athlet-
ics. They claim if women receive equal financial aid in their athletic pro-
grams that most male athletes will be forced to pay their own way.
"Women are going to get scholarships and the sport that makes money
19751
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possibility exists that equal funding may be required in the
future, equivalence of expenditures for athletic scholarships is
far from a threat at present.' 5'
CONCLUSION
"[I]n a knowledge-based society, equal opportunity in
education is fundamental to equality in all other forms of
is going to get scholarships." Paterno said, "Everyone else is going to be
hurt." [Other] comments included:
"I believe in girls having their own programs, but I don't think girls are
quite ready."
"If they want to have their own program, fine. But they can't compete
with men."
"If the politicians don't start using some judgment instead of just going
after the female vote . .. .
"I See Hearings on S. 2518 Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 9, 1973) (Testimony of Billie Jean King); Gilbert
and Williamson, Sport is Unfair to Women, Part I, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 25, 1973,
at 92. But see Louisville Courier-Journal, July 22, 1975, at B6, Col. 1: "Ky. State's
Russell takes increase in girls' athletic budget in stride," indicating that priority for
the increase in the women's athletic budget at Kentucky State University will go to
recruit outstanding female high school athletes. "We've always had a quality program
at Kentucky State . . . but we were only able to work with interested students on
campus. Now we know what to expect before the season starts."
At present, women receive no athletic scholarships at the University of Kentucky.
This is the only school in Kentucky which is not offering athletic scholarships to
women. U.K. has a better program than other schools and is losing athletes to other
Kentucky schools which do offer athletic scholarships to women. Telephone interview
with Betty Gordon, Sports Information Director for Women's Athletics and women's
golf coach at University of Kentucky, Oct. 20, 1975. See also 121 Cong. Rec. S 13,529
(daily ed. July 24, 1975) (remarks of Senator Clark):
No one wants to see [big time college atheltics] destroyed, nor can we
reasonably expect that this will happen where Title IX is enforced. What will
happen is that women, as well as men, will now be able to participate fully
in athletics. No longer can women be relegated to inferior facilities, equip-
ment or scheduling options. Title IX will not require equal spending, but it
does require equal opportunities for men and women in athletics. A look at
present spending figures reveals an unbelieveable inequality-of the $300
million spent annually on collegiate athletic programs, only 2 percent is
spent on women's athletics. It cannot be argued that there is no interest in
women's athletics. The Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women
. . . was formed in 1971 with 280 member schools; today the group's
membership totals more than 650. Spectator interest is not lacking either
S. .. It is obvious that enthusiasm for women's activities is growing and
that these programs will continue to involve more and more people. With
that, the entire field of athletic endeavor-men's and women's, profes-
sional and amateur-will be strengthened.
Id. at S 13,529.
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human endeavor.' 51 2 The courts, using the equal protection
doctrine, have not developed any positive test to determine
when equal opportunity in educational athletics has been pro-
vided.
The barriers "constructed against women over the years
desperately needed to be torn down, and Congress helped to do
that through the 1972 Education Amendments.' 5 3 Although
HEW indicates that the effects of the athletics sections of the
regulations are "not the most important thing[s] that [are]
going to come out of Title IX,"' 54 it is still HEW's hope that
the regulations will help change attitudes about women in ath-
letics.'55 "Implementation of the Title IX regulations certainly
is not going to bring about an instant end to discrimination,"'56
largely because so many questions remain as to what equality
of opportunity for women in athletics requires. Each educa-
tional institution receiving federal funds will have to evaluate
the athletic program to determine whether it provides both
men and women with an equal opportunity to participate in a
meaningful way. '57
Basic questions remain unanswered: What is meaningful
participation for women? What best serves the interests of
women in the area of educational athletics? Is it promoting to
the fullest the exceptional female athlete, or providing re-
sources for segregated teams so that all women will have a
chance to play? It would seem that in order to provide the
greatest opportunity for all women, facilities for both separate
and coeducational activities should be provided. HEW's regu-
lations make this ideal possible, but at the same time allow
educational institutions flexibility to create their own reasona-
ble methods for compliance. It is very likely that budgetary
limitations will prompt most institutions to choose a reasona-
,s2 Press Conference, supra note 22, at 3.
' 121 CONG. REC. S 13,529 (daily ed. July 24, 1975) (remarks of Senator Clark).
' ' Telephone inquiry, supra note 24.
' Id. "The athletics section is only one section in education, and achieving
equality in athletics isn't going to solve all [women's] problems..... It's going to
have to come up with the children. ...."
' ' 121 CONG. REC. S 13,529 (daily ed. July 24, 1975) (remarks of Senator Clark).
, Memorandum, supra note 21, at 8: "The equal opportunity emphasis in the
regulation addresses the totality of the athletic program of the institution rather than
each sport offered."
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ble "either-or" approach rather than an attempt to provide the
maximum program possible. As long as the focus rests on the
equal protection analysis of whether women should be allowed
to participate with men in various sports, the question of what
constitutes equality of opportunity in athletics will remain
unanswered.
While it is unlikely that the regulations themselves will
affect attitudes toward women in athletics in the immediate
future, they do mandate changed behavior on the part of edu-
cational institutions receiving federal funds. In the long run,
the required changes concerning financial support and better
training, facilities, equipment, and publicity should, at a mini-
mum, produce more women athletes and more careers for
women in sports. Thus far the effect of the regulations has been
to generate a great deal of interest, concern, and debate as to
what is required from various interested parties. HEW believes
its regulations will enforce equality of opportunity for women
in athletics; it is now up to the schools to effectuate their con-
ception of equal opportunity and up to women to demand what
the regulations make possible. Title IX's regulations for athlet-
ics have the potential to cover the bases, but they can succeed
only if the rules of the game of equal opportunity for women
are ascertained and the funds necessary to implement the game
are made available.
Judith Lee Oliphant
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